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JC.

7 August 1974

Scowcroft at the latter's request. General Wickham called to ask for this as the transmittal note was coming out of the typewriter.  25X1  2			
1. Attached for your information is a note I sent to the Secretary of Defense forwarding a brief wrap-up of current indicators prepared by for Brent Scowcroft at the latter's request. General Wickham called to ask for this as the transmittal note was coming out of the typewriter.  25X1  2. session with Brent went very well. They talked for 15 minutes prior to Brent's going to the Vice President's office for a 1430 briefing that had been laid on before any of this Vietnam business came up. Scowcroft professed himself pleased with the intelligence alert and the Community's performance on this matter.  25X1  3. called at about 1515 to "report" (his word) that DIA had given the Chiefs a briefing on Vietnam in the Tank at 1400. said it had gone very well and he and very much appreciated our telephonic alert this morning after my conversation with Schlesinger since as a result they had the briefing virtually prepared when DIA got the crash request to present it on short notice.  4. General Wickham called about 1535 to say that Schlesinger had note and it was exactly what he wanted. Schlesinger recognized that the Intelligence Community was running up a warning flag, reviewing evidence open to several levels of interpretation and not necessarily proving that a major offensive was imminent, but nonetheless Schlesinger had felt the matter should be taken seriously particularly in light of Hanoi's possible readings of current U.S. domestic difficulties.		MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director	
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